Suez 1956: The Inside Story of the First Oil War Kindle Edition

In the mid-1950s British influence and imperial power was in serious decline but few, especially in the ruling Conservative Party, wanted to acknowledge this reality. Through miscalculation, mis-step and sheer stupidity the end result of this political psychosis - which unhappily combined with the French disaster in Algeria - was the abortive invasion of Suez.Where this book excels is in its description of the run up to the invasion on the British side. Where it is lacking is an equally thorough treatment of the French and a real examination of how, after just two days, the invasion ended in ignominy.

A good book, it really explains the political misjudgment's on the part of the allies and the power of American displeasure and the consequences for the Middle East

This 470 page tome with 30 pages of notes but with no bibliography is an adequate expose of the 1956 Suez incident.The book is badly presented as the 25 chapters have no headings only numbers so the reader can not judge time, place or incident.The author has done a good deal of research but there are a number of elementary errors.His conclusion that this was an oil war is more than a little suspect.The lesson that Britain should have learned from this episode is never trust the Americans.

great book worth the price and postage

A very good book that explains the cause of the crisis and why Eden had a breakdown over it - The secret involvement of Israel who were going to feint an invasion so we could come to their defence as an excuse to invade the canal zone - it is interesting to ponder what would have happened if nothing was done. It is easy now to look at it and be confused by the whole idea that we could take control of the canal but at the time the waterway was seen as a prime target for our enemies. Also Britain was still trying to recover economically and the idea that our oil supplies could be cut off was too much for Eden who saw Nasser as another Hitler.

Good description of item and speedy service

When Gordon Brown was proclaimed to be the worst Prime Minister Britain has ever had, one newspaper columnist suggested that the estate of Anthony Eden should sue. Barry Turner, the author of "Suez 1956", would probably agree.The Suez Campaign, Operation "Musketeer", was Britain's last imperial war (if you take the Falklands to be a face-saving rescue mission and Iraq and Afghanistan as mere adjuncts to American policy), at a time when Britain was no longer an imperial power but had yet to realise it (and I don't think it has yet fully accepted it). This book does draw very clear parallels between the case against Egypt's seizure of the Suez Canal and the drumbeating some fifty years later regarding Saddam Hussein's "weapons of mass destruction", particularly in that when one excuse for war faltered, another was found to take its' place.This is a comprehensive account of the Suez crisis and its' origins, starting with Napoleon's dreams of a Mediterranean-Red Sea canal and taking us through the labours of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the arrival of the British and their subsequent policy towards Egypt, and the first big standoff over the Canal - the so-called "abrogation crisis" - between 1951 and 1954, when a certain Mr Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, was at the forefront of efforts to negotiate a British withdrawal. Towards Eden, Turner is scathing, portraying him as a vain, arrogant, deceitful, spiteful, vindictive, unhinged creature, corrupted by the power of his office, with his Cabinet almost uniformly - with particular opprobrium going to Eden's Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd - condemned as spineless little men without the gumption to halt the steamroller to war. In this, Turner nails his colours firmly to the mast: "Musketeer" was a fiasco, militarily as well as politically. HM Forces are painted very negatively, with ineptly-led and under-motivated troops sent into battle with old equipment and poor communications, and in no way prepared for rapid response to sudden overseas crises. But of course, this was not just a British adventure - the French and the Israelis were involved, too, and Turner seems to view them with much more understanding and sympathy than he does his own countrymen, suggesting that they at least had just cause of sorts for attacking Egypt (Colonel Nasser's support for rebels in French Algeria, and his threats to destroy Israel) whereas Eden just wanted to beef up his ego. He attacks frontally the old argument about the Americans "stabbing us in the back", quoting numerous sources to illustrate that at no point did the Eisenhower Administration ever sanction or support military action against Egypt, and indeed made repeated and seemingly honest efforts to avert it. Furthermore, if you somehow think that the West could have responded any differently, you will find resonance with Turner's agreement that the Suez campaign gave the Soviet Union the diversion it needed to crush the Hungarian Uprising that was going on at the same time. Personally, I find it difficult to believe that the West WOULD have acted any differently without Suez, in that there was very little it could do short of going to war. The most damning indictment of Eden in this book is the fact that, having contrived so much to get his war, he ultimately lacked the courage to see it through once the pressure began to bear down on him. As his predecessor famously said of the operation: "I wouldn't have dared; and if I had done, I wouldn't have dared stop." Eden stopped, and it destroyed him, as well as tarnishing Britain's reputation for several decades onward. If Operation "Desert Storm" was America's exorcism of Vietnam, then the Falklands War was Britain ejecting the ghost of Suez.All-in-all, this is a highly readable, briskly and at times humourously written study of the Suez Crisis, with equal time given to the political, diplmoatic and military aspects. Turner's vituperation on the subject of Eden and the British Government as a whole means that, as a history, it should be treated with a little caution, but as a means of broadly understanding how things happened, and why, it is highly recommended.