On War, Indexed Edition Paperback – June 1, 1989

This is one of the handful of classic books on the subject of war, and one made easier to navigate with the addition of a valuable index.“If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen [in war], two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.” —Carl von ClausewitzPrussian General Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Swiss Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) lived in Europe in the age of Napoleon, with both vying for the title of “Father of Modern Military Strategy.” Clausewitz believed each situation had its own solution, with, unlike Jomini, no general solution given. Clausewitz explored the fundamental nature of war and emphasized the defensive-offensive. A self-disciplined, competent Prussian staff officer, Clausewitz had been a professional soldier since the age of twelve. As dean of modern military theorists, he proposed in On War that absolute war (an ideal with a high level of energy and professionalism; not “total war”) cannot exist because “countless minor incidents—the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance.” … “But War is no pastime; no mere passion for venturing and winning; no work of a free enthusiasm: it is a serious means for a serious object. All that appearance which it wears from the varying hues of fortune, all that it assimilates into itself of the oscillations of passion, of courage, of imagination, of enthusiasm, are only particular properties of this means.”Clausewitz’s influence has been profound. He believed in the defensive strength, urged a greater democracy for Prussia’s citizens, and thought war a serious, hazardous business. Yet, because understanding him was difficult, many of his early students merely focused only upon his most forceful expressions. As a result, for over fifty years, Clausewitz was denounced as a “Prussianist,” a fanatical believer in mass warfare, and a champion of the offensive, regardless of losses. “Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to War, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until someone steps in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body.” Furthermore, “It is necessary to either wage war with the utmost energy, or not at all.”One of Clausewitz’s most significant contributions was his emphasis on the moral forces in war. This emphasis includes his concept of “friction in war,” which explains why military theory often proves challenging to put into practice. “Strategic problems may be very simple, but they still will not be easy to solve. ... The Commander…finds himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true information, of mistakes committed through fear, through negligence, through haste; of disregard of his authority, either from mistaken on correct motives, from ill will, true or false sense of duty; of indolence or exhaustion, of accidents, which no mortal could have foreseen. In short, he is the victim of a hundred thousand impressions, most of which are intimidating, few of which are encouraging. By long experience in War, one acquires the sensitive perception [necessary] for quickly determining the [true] value of these incidents; high courage and stability of character stand proof against them, as the rock resists the beating of the waves. ... Further, there is hardly any celebrated enterprise in War which was not achieved by endless exertions, pains, and privations; ...only an immense force of will... can conduct us to our goal. Therefore, a commander requires a cool intelligence, a strength of character, and audacity, as well as technical competence. The calculation of time and space, although it is always the foundation of strategy, is neither its most difficult nor most decisive element.... The correct judgment of their opponents, the audacity to leave only a small force before them. ...energy in forced marches, boldness in sudden attacks, the intensified activity which great souls acquire in the moment of danger, these are...(what wins) victories.... Boldness, directed by overruling intelligence, is the mark of the hero.”Unlike Jomini, Clausewitz is said to have scoffed at the thought that there were principles of war. However, On War does suggest the following general principles (or generalizations):Discover how to gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point. [Center of Gravity]—Identify the decisive point and concentrate everything on it, removing forces from secondary fronts and ignoring lesser objectives. Calculate moral factors. Make the best use of the few means at one’s disposal. Never lack calmness and firmness...without this firm resolution, no great results can be achieved in the most successful war. Always have the choice between the most audacious and the most careful solution...no military leader has ever become great without audacity. Forces are more effective in a concentric [“interior lines”] rather than in a parallel attack; one can attack concentrically without having decisive superiority in an engagement. Always seek to envelop that part of the enemy against which we direct our main attack. Cut off the enemy from his line of retreat. To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy, always direct one’s principal operation against the main body of the enemy army or at least against an important portion of his forces. Take possession of the enemy’s material and other sources of strength and direct operations against the places where most of these resources are concentrated. To gain public opinion, win through great victories and the occupation of the enemy's capital. Use one’s entire force with the utmost energy. Focus on the decisive point of attack. Never waste time. Use surprise more in tactics than in strategy. Pursue the enemy after his defeat. Concentrate forces at the main point. An attack on the lines of communication takes effect only very slowly, while victory on the battlefield bears fruit immediately. In strategy, the side surrounded by the enemy is better off than the side surrounding its opponent, especially with equal or even weaker forces. To cut the enemy’s line of retreat, a strategic envelopment or a turning movement is very effective. Be physically and morally superior. Preserve stores of supplies, upon which operations absolutely depend. Provisioning troops is a necessary condition of warfare and thus greatly influences operations. Act independently. Knowledge must become capability. For a different, relatively short overview of Clausewitz’s advice, check out his Principles of War, the precursor to On War, available in a free online version.Note: Clausewitz uses the term Center of Gravity (CoG) about 40 times in his book, with various implied meanings. The definition of a CoG, as given by the United States Department of Defense, is “The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.” CoG = Schwerpunkt = heavy point = focal point = decisive point = main emphasis. Clausewitz most often implied that the CoG is where mass is concentrated. Thus, if this vital point is unprotected, it is the most attractive target for a blow.Of value is Amazon’s “Look inside” feature, giving one an overview and sample of what’s in the book. There one will find: Table of Contents, Editors’ Note. Book 1, Chapters 1. What is War 2. Purpose and Means in War, and most of Chapter 3. On Military Genius.Missing in the “Look inside” overview are, between the Editors’ Note (by Howard and Paret) and Book 1, Introductory Essays (3, by Parent Howard, and Brodie).Then follow 8 Books: 1. On the Nature of War, 2. On the Theory of War, 3. On Strategy in General, 4. The Engagement, 5. Military Forces, 6. Defense, 7. The Attack, 8. War Plans.Next, there is the Commentary (A Guide to Reading On War by Bernard Brodie). The reader would probably find benefit by skimming this section at the end of the book before starting to read at the beginning.Finally, and again, this edition of On War has a very valuable index of names and places. Unfortunately, it does not include concepts, a feature that while valuable, might, however, prove difficult to assemble.Bottom-line, this is a relatively difficult book to read, but, as a recognized masterpiece, it remains a must-have for any complete library on military strategy.If interested in more information about strategy (to include a section on Clausewitz), consider reading the following book which distills and integrates the works of 87 master strategists: Strategic Advantage: How to Win in War, Business, and Life

This particular edition benefits from the great scholarship and well written introductory (and explanatory!) essays of Peter Paret, Bernard Brodie, and Michael Howard. On War is required reading for mid-grade US military officers and a common reference and discussion point for operational and strategic analysis. This is the essential book, and this translation makes it lucid and comprehensible.von Clausewitz wrestles with many discreet topics of interest to students and practitioners of military affairs. In doing so, however, he approaches war in a very special way: he seeks to understand and describe the fundamental nature of war. This is timeless. Significant portions of the book could be read as a study of the relationship of war to societies and to the human condition.The greatest value-add point of the book is that, in contrast to the offerings of many other writers, Clausewitz asserts that there are no checklists or programs to guarantee success in war. Instead, the student of warfare, and the General in command, both must study history, study human nature, and apply critical thinking to develop good judgement concerning the conduct of war. For a society and military establishment that tend always to train for, and to fight, the last war rather than the next one, this is big wisdom.The downside, and one reason On War was not initially as popular as works by competitors who experienced the same Napoleonic revolution in warfare, is that von Clausewitz still requires military leaders to think. The true nature of war is complex, contextual, and chaotic. Among those who demand clear answers and black-and-white rules, who want a book to tell them the what to do rather than push them to develop wisdom concerning war, von Clausewitz's message is not generally well received.Those other works, however, have fallen progressively out of favor except as excerpts for students in military colleges to contrast against On War. This is largely because their authors tried to write programs to victory. As history has moved on, so has their relevance. For example, what constituted hot, leading edge commentary on how many muskets to deploy with your pikemen in 1815 is, today, well...The weakness of On War, aside from it being unfinished and far short of what von Clausewitz and his wife would have produced had sickness not claimed him early, is that it is bound up in the context of European land war. This impacts areas such as his nascent discussion of limited war and causes him substantially to skip the maritime dimension. Julian Corbett's Principals of Maritime Strategy bridges this gap admirably and, in my opinion, should be read next after On War.Overall, On War is what you think it is: the foundation of much modern military thinking and essential to any sophisticated understanding of war in the international security environment.

The prefatory essays are very good, and helpful in understanding the background and being able to frame yourself into charitably and profitably reading Clausewitz. It shouldn't come as a shock that Clausewitz did not write for the modern era, but what surprises most people is that his principles still apply, and in many cases when they don't they can be modified, or springboard into a better concept that does.He writes exclusively about land strategy. This is a little unfortunate, as it doesn't show the whole picture. However, he writes about land strategy excellently. It seems as though he mixes discussions of tactics in throughout his writing, which are insightful and thought-provoking applications of some of the strategy portions. However, the tactics portions can get quite dry. Not everyone immediately sees the benefit in several pages worth of discussion on how to defend a swamp in the 1800s. That said, even the dry portions still can yield interesting insights and discussions.My favorite chapter was the brief, one paragraph, on invasions. He writes about the use of the word to distinguish it from attack as "unscientific linguistic confusion." Ah, if only he was around today...buzzwords are nothing new it seems.The outline / commentary in the back is also a helpful reference as you read.Clausewitz provides some of the best fruit for thought on strategy and warfare, and I found his work to be particularly interesting in a group discussion of it. It is worth the effort. If you're short on time or reading patience, an abridged version won't hurt you though. But this edition is worth it for the introductory essays and commentary in addition, which are invaluable aids.