Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Contributions in Military Studies, 32)

Excellent analysis of the differences in the organisation between the US and German armies during WWII, which made the German so much more efficient than the American. The main reason was the German inclination to decentralize decisions as far down as possible. Regiments were made up of soldiers from the same district in Germany, and regimental commanders decided who to train for officers, who to promote, who to decorate and who to punish. Assessments were made qualitatively, and the main qualities looked for in an officer, and a soldier, where creativity, iniative, and decisiveness. The American system was centralized, many of the best men where at home, doing numerical analysis on developments at the front. As utterly sinister as the nazi system was, the organisation of its war machine was, strangely enough, more human than the American one, and it proves valuable lessons for anyone.

This is a rare book on military history. Much military history is like business or sports journalism. Everybody loves a winner, so the best way to write a popular book is to pick a winner and then tell a good story about how they won. Very often what makes a good story is not very rigorous or scientific. In contrast Fighting Power is like a detailed comparative sociology of military organization. There is a great deal of research and rigor here. I don't have the background to check the facts but it seemed quite thorough, and I found it all very interesting.

Incredible work. While some criticize it for failing to consider stats for prisoners of war and using the Italian campaign as a basis, the conclusions of this work are manifest in any reasoned view of the actual leadership of American forces in Europe during WWII and the performance of American arms. Van Crevald acknowledges that Germany lost the war, but unlike his critics, sees that the overall result does not of itself demonstrate the superiority of American leadership or unit performance. Van Crevald's book isn't about strategic operations, or even operational performance, it is more relevant to the tactical level, although it does encroach to a certain extent on the operational. Any fair reading of combat operations in WWII must result in the conclusion that while American commanders improved as the war progressed they, and their units (not all, some of the infantry divisions and the 82nd and 101st Airborne must be considered, especially in Normandy and Holland during Market Garden, the equal of any German division - also had the Americans had tanks which could equal the German tanks the 2nd 3d, 4th and 6th Arnored Divisions, stand in good comparison to the German) did not achieve the same level as excellence as the German, and relied more on firepower (artillery and close air support) to achieve their goals - the choice certainly saved lives, and ultimately achieved victory, but that doesn't change the probity of Van Crevald's analysis.

The book assumes that the German army performed better in WW2 than the United States Forces. It tries to workout why. Despite the fact that one would expect that an authoritarian country like Germany would have a system of blind obedience the opposite was the case. The key to how their army worked was the devolution of authority. Commanders would be given a general objective but they could pursue it as they liked. Individual initiative was encouraged, as was audacity. The United States on the other hand was the country of Taylorism. A management culture that did not trust those lower down in the hierarchy and broke work down into simple components and expected blind obedience.To make matters worse the techniques of allocating recruits in the United States Army was based on previous work experience. Those with any qualification or training were placed in army jobs that were similar to those they had in civilian employment. This meant that those going to rifle divisions were the most poorly educated and problematic recruits.The replacement policy and training of officers also created issues with the development of a team structure. Officers in the United States army were not allowed to fraternize with enlisted men. (They had separate facilities and were seen as remote by their men.) German officers lived with their men and developed close ties to them. The German's also tried to base their units on geographic areas. This was so that soldiers would have a shared history and ethos. Replacements came into units not as individuals but as groups of men who had trained together and built up bonds with each other.Part of the problem of course was that the United States army was more or less built from scratch. It was expanded from a few thousand men prior to the war within a short time to some millions. The German's had a longer military history that went back a long way. One of the strengths of Creveld's book is that he shows that the German's looked with care at the performance of the army in the First World War. A good deal of the organisational structure was developed to deal with earlier problems.All in all a good book although probably a bit dry for the general reader. One also wonders if the use of the Taylor model was not sensible in the circumstances. The United States did not have the time to train up officers in combat and the model they adopted worked. Admittedly with armies that outnumbered their opponents and had air and naval support.

Essential read if you wish to understand the strengths and weaknesses of these respective militaries. You will be better to understand why the military reflects the society it comes from.

Interesting comparison. Although it was not quite what I expected. The reasonable price makes it a worthwhile purchase to read in any case.

I opened this and saw all kinds of tables and inwardly groaned, but fortunately I found this slim volume to be eye-opening and interesting.Having read Rick Atkinson's trilogy on the US Army in WW2, this was a good supplement.Atkinson noted that 8 to 9 Germans were killed by the Russians for every 1 killed by the Americans but Robert Citano also stated,in reference to American abundance of material, sometimes quantity is its own quality.

It is generally accepted that with very few exceptions the German army in WW II fought very well, both in offensive and in defensive operations, even against overwhelming odds and when it was clear that the war was lost, and even though many of the army's leaders had little sympathy for the Nazi regime. What is the explanation for this consistently high performance? Any attempt at deeper historical understanding must avoid the purely anecdotal and the pseudo-psychological. Professor Van Creveld in his book "Fighting Power" (defined as the sum total of the mental qualities that make armies fight) investigates, on the basis of statistics, a number of interesting aspects, and draws comparisons with the U.S. Army of the time.Organisation, doctrine, personnel administration, medical care, selection and training of officers and NCO's are all covered.A striking difference is how in the U.S. Army, with its penchant for management science and social and human engineering, officers and men were treated as interchangeable cogs in a machine, whereas the German army accepted and overcame considerable administrative and technical difficulties to make sure that from the start soldiers developed and maintained a strong bond with a particular regiment and with each other.In spite of the stereotype of the arrogant monocled Prussian officer who treats his men like so much cannon fodder, it would seem that in reality there often was a closer relationship between German officers and their men than was the case in the U.S. Army.Martin van Creveld is an entertaining writer who has mastered his subjects and provides illuminating insights in his discussions of aspects of military history that are often overlooked. Among his other books, I found "Supplying War" (about logistics since the 17th century) particularly interesting.

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The text type and book quality is cheap. The content excellent...building on Col. Dupuy's work adding extensive documentation and clarity as to the construct 'fighting power' vis-a-vis the US armed forces in contrast with the Deutsche Wehrmacht.As a psychologist my interest is focussed and outcomes in respect of mortality and psychological injury. The work is useful on this count alone. In relation to the steady unrelenting stream of representations of the Wehrmacht as a hoard of wooden ideological and stupid stick figures, Dr Creveld, a scholar of Jewish descent has performed a very useful work in the service of explaining that we still have much to learn.

Not a good choice for war readers.Its just numerical analysis and mathematical calculationDoes not signify any aspect of War Scenario or Realistic Comparisons.

A very good analytical study of the differences between the German and US approach to creating their respective armed forces in WWII. It is fairly apparent that the German approach was far superior in most departments leading to much greater 'fighting power' overall, although it is not clear if all of the hard learnings from that have been adopted by NATA armed forces since that time. The US suffered from having to raise, train and equip large forces rapidly, but it is sadly true that many allied troops must have died and the war lengthened as a result of poor structure of things such as the US replacement system, officer training and appointments. I would recommend this book to any person with involvement in the armed forces or political adminisration of the armed forces for lessons in 'how to do it/not do it'.