Fire-Power: The British Army Weapons & Theories of War 1904–1945 (Pen & Sword Military Classics Book 44)

This title, first published in 1982, offers an objective and thoroughly-researched analysis of the evolution of British military tactics, with an emphasis on artillery. This title all but dispenses with grand strategy, allowing the authors to convey a wealth of knowledge on battlefield tactics. It is a dense, intense read. I found it compelling and hard to put down, yet the complexity of good information was so great that I will probably have to re-read it several times to get the full benefit - it is likely to become a frequently-consulted source on my reference shelf.There is too much here to convey in a short summary, so I'll emphasize the desert war. Entranced by the Western Desert's wide-open spaces, their early victory over the Italians, and the need to protect from air attack, the British over-emphasized dispersion and mobility. This adaption was most seriously manifested in the Jock Column, a mobile formation that allowed forces without tanks to score some early victories against the Italians, and to cover for lack of tanks during various retreats and screening actions such as the little-known period after the failure of Operation Battleaxe in the summer of 1941.Threadbare success in Operation Crusader was followed by disaster at Gazala. The authors are insightful enough to avoid "Auchinleck-bashing," a holdover from Montgomery's cult of personality and the self-promoting, even libelous, quality of his memoirs. By the time he stopped Rommel at First Alamein in early July, 1942, Auchinleck was correcting the lack of coordinated, precise firepower that had allowed earlier British defeats. Indeed, Eighth Army was improving throughout the desert war, and Auchinleck's reforms were helpful in the final victory, whatever Montgomery may have said. Yet the authors go on to point out that Montgomery's thorough approach was cathartic for Eighth Army, returning the emphasis to concentration, combined arms, and proper use of artillery. If it seems to some authors that Montgomery was returning to practices from 1918, that is correct; in 1918 the British army used all-arms cooperation to dominate the Western Front offensives of late summer and the fall.There is much, much more in this title, including plenty of detail on the nature of weapons systems, particularly the guns and how they were commanded, aimed, and supplied. The footnotes are thorough, thoughtfully documented and numbered consecutively from beginning to end, allowing quicker reference for the research-minded. The author points out how personal hubris among cavalry officers helped feed the lack of tank-infantry cooperation that dogged British forces at Gazala and elsewhere; the bulk of British armored formations carried a little too much horse-boy arrogance. The Royal Tank regiment units, less numerous and not so flamboyant, were better for the serious business of war. There is much, much more in this title but it is for serious scholars, not light-hearted hobbyists.

An interesting look at the culture of the British Army, and it's impact on the conduct of two wars. There's a lot there. There is a good deal of detail, but it seems the author has taken care to not over burden the reader. The interwar culture of the Royal Artillery is quite interesting, and sad. I hadn't much interest in the study of the Royal Artillery, but a friend was reading so I thought I'd have a go, and was not disappointed. It is stunning to see what the French and British thought prior to the First World War. From a 21st Century perspective, it's hard to fathom why they would have had such archaic views. And, given the professional strides gained during the First War, to see them slip away in the interwar period is heartbreaking.

The mental image of World War 1 fighting is of lines of men climbing out of trenches and walking or running across a chewed up landscape in the teeth of chattering machine guns. Tens of thousands of casualties later, progress is measured in terms of yards. All of this created the impression that the armies of the time had no other idea than simply throwing men at the machine guns with no strategy and no ideas beyond the frontal attack. This book takes on that image and attempts to prove that it was fundamentally untrue as far as the British Army was concerned. It documents the doctrinal thinking and efforts from 1904 through the end of World War 2 and points out the major stumbling blocks and problems that did not allow for powerful combined arms warfare to develop. While not stinting in its pointing out specific individuals who were less than helpful, it does show that the British Army was thinking about the problems of warfare and did come up with the right concepts to win the war. The authors claim that you can see that in the smooth operations of the last 100 days of the war and the campaign that finally broke the back of German resistance.The debates around how to structure warfare started before World War 1 as the book chronicles. While the ideas were there, the soldiers did not necessarily accept them and the book shows clearly who were the pockets of resistance, and why. When the war erupted, the Army was not ready and consequently the first three years of warfare marked by the mass slaughter is what we know.However, the doctrinal thinking was moving forward and by 1916 and 1917, the equipment necessary was starting to come together. The book explains how the concept of combined arms required the development of new techniques of communications and decision-making. No longer was it acceptable to wait for messengers to arrive from the front with hand-written notes (if they survived the trip). Coordinating artillery with infantry movements and aligning them towards the same targets and at the same time frames required better communications and better methods of mapping and communications. The development of the tank and airplane allowed for even more ways of putting the needed firepower on the selected targets at the right time, so that by the end of the war, it was back to a war of maneuver.Between the two World Wars, the British Army regressed. The techniques and policies that helped it win the first war decayed and were abandoned before the second war started. Consequently many casualties were incurred until the collection of forces came back together again to allow for victory. In this part, the authors are particularly bitter about the RAF that decided that its only function was to carry out strategic bombing and therefor was not used, nor was it visible, in support of the military forces of its own nation.While the back cover states that the focus of this book is on the artillery arm due to the history of the authors, I did not find it to focus on the artillery. Rather, I thought it covered all aspects of fire-power equally.All in all, this book traces the development of the doctrine from the thinking stages to the implementation stages across the 40 year period it covers and explains how it all finally came together and succeeded. For those who care about such things, this is a good read. It is not an easy book to read, as it does not focus much on the personalities or the flashier parts of warfare. But, if you want to understand some of the reasons for how warfare developed the way it did, this book fulfills that role. For this reason I am giving it a four star rating.

excellent

El libro nos habla de la evolución que vivió la artillería británica desde comienzos del siglo XX hasta el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. A mi modo de ver, se anda mucho por las ramas. Dice cosas interesantes, pero contiene mucha información que es poco relevante, sobre todo para un lector no británico.

This book is a very good read and describes in great detail the firepower revolution which occurred in the early 20th CenturyThe book deals with large artillery pieces as well as small armsIn many places comparisons are made between developments made in the German and French armies which is particularly useful to those studying the first warThis book is important when trying to understand the combat doctrine employed by the British army during WW1

I had previously purchased a copy for myself and found it very informative, and felt that a friend should be as well informed as I. Alan Ridley

Great book, great service. Many thanks.